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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal decides whether Dale Carter Shackelford will spend the rest of his 
life in prison, without any hope or chance of parole, despite a number of errors occurring 
before and during his sentencing hearing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A jury found Dale Carter Shackelford guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, 
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, first-degree arson, conspiracy to commit first-
degree arson, and preparing false evidence. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 361-
62 (2010). Eight months later, the district court held a sentencing hearing. Id. at 362. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found the State had proven two 
aggravating factors against Mr. Shackelford, and after weighing the cumulative 
mitigation against each aggravator, the mitigation was not sufficiently compelling to 
make the death penalty unjust, sentencing Mr. Shackelford to death for each first-
degree murder. Id. In addition, Mr. Shackelford received the following sentences for 
the non-homicide offenses: first-degree arson, 25 years fixed; conspiracy to commit 
first-degree murder, fixed life; conspiracy to commit first-degree arson, 25 years fixed; 
and preparing false evidence, 5 years fixed. (39398 Tr., p.65, Ls.13-24.)1 
1 The record from Mr. Shackelford's sentencing in 2011, in case 39398, consists of one 
volume of a clerk's record, one volume of a transcript, one presentence investigation 
report (PSI) from Mr. Shackelford's original sentencing, and an updated presentence 
investigation report (UPSI). Citation to these documents will be by page number. In 
addition, because the district court explicitly relied on the prior proceedings in reaching 
its sentencing decision, a motion for this Court to take judicial notice of the prior records 
on appeal, including the clerk's records, transcripts, presentence investigation reports 
and other exhibits from prior proceedings before this Court, is being filed simultaneously 
with this brief. 
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Mr. Shackelford appealed from his convictions and filed a petition for post-
conviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-2719. Id. at 363. The district court 
granted Mr. Shackelford sentencing relief after concluding that a jury, not a judge, must 
conduct the weighing of mitigating circumstances against each aggravating 
circumstance to comply with Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). As a result, the 
district court set aside Mr. Shackelford's death sentences but denied all other claims 
and deemed the remaining sentencing claims moot. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Shackelford's underlying 
convictions and the district court's order setting aside Mr. Shackelford's sentences, but 
on different grounds. Id. at 387-88. The Court concluded that the jury's verdicts finding 
Mr. Shackelford guilty of two counts of first-degree murder in the same county on the 
same date were insufficient to prove the aggravating circumstance that at the time one 
murder was committed; the defendant also committed another murder. Id. 
Mr. Shackelford's case was remanded for resentencing pursuant to Idaho Code section 
19-2515. Id. at 388. 
On remand, the district court reappointed the same counsel who represented 
Mr. Shackelford at the original trial and sentencing. (R.39398, p.10.) At a status review 
hearing six weeks later, the prosecutor disclosed the State was still considering whether 
it would seek the death penalty. (R.39398, p.12.) A month later, the State filed a notice 
of its intent not to ask for death, and instead urged the court to impose two fixed life 
sentences upon Mr. Shackelford. (R.39398, pp.14-20.) 
When the State decided not to seek death and it was clear Judge Stegner would 
be responsible for sentencing Mr. Shackelford, not a jury, Mr. Shackelford moved to 
disqualify Judge Stegner, both with and without case. (R.39398, pp.23-24, 64-77.) 
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Judge Stegner denied the motion to disqualify without cause, concluding because 
Mr. Shackelford's case was remanded for resentencing, not a new trial, he had no right 
to an automatic disqualification under Idaho Appellate Rule 25(a)(5). (R.39398, pp.29-
30.) Judge Stegner also denied Mr. Shackelford's motion to disqualify for cause, 
concluding he had no "actual prejudice against [Mr. Shackelford] of such a nature to 
render it improbable that the Court carry out the sentencing in a fair and impartial 
manner." (R.39398, p.97; 39398 Tr., p.26, L.10 - p.28, L.1.) Judge Stegner specifically 
denied that his exposure to volumes of information about Mr. Shackelford, including 
statements of Mr. Shackelford's co-defendants in their own cases which were not 
subject to cross-examination by Mr. Shackelford, as well as privileged communications 
between counsel and Mr. Shackelford, prejudiced him against Mr. Shackelford. (39398 
Tr., p.26, L.17 - p.27, L.25.) Without objection, the court ordered the preparation of an 
update to Mr. Shackelford's original presentence investigation report (PSI) and imposed 
deadlines for objecting to the updated report. (R.39398 R., pp.34-35.) 
Mr. Shackelford then filed a written objection to the original PSI, the Updated PSI 
(UPSI) and related attachments on a number of grounds, including relevance, reliability, 
confrontation clause/Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) violations, and 
improper victim impact evidence in violation of State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548 (2008). 
(R.39398, pp.89-90.) Neither the State nor the court addressed Mr. Shackelford's 
objections to the PSI and UPSI prior to sentencing. 
At the sentencing hearing, the court asked if Mr. Shackelford wanted to rebut or 
explain anything in the PSI or UPSI. (39398 Tr., p.36, Ls.3-20.) Mr. Shackelford rested 
on his prior written objection, and then offered testimony from two witnesses: Idaho 
Department of Correction (IDOC) officer Jerald Miller and IDOC Probation and Parole 
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officer Jackye Squire-Leonard. (39398 Tr., p.36, Ls.21-22; 39398 Tr., p.40, L.3 - p.41, 
L.13 (Officer Miller); 39398 Tr., p.42, L.19 - p.57, L.17 (Officer Squire-Leonard).) Officer 
Miller explained one of Mr. Shackelford's Disciplinary Offense Report (DOR) violations 
as a misunderstanding, and Officer Squire-Leonard explained the purpose of a PSI, 
who she spoke with in preparing Mr. Shackelford's PSI and UPSI, and what information 
she relied on and included in both. (39398 Tr., p.40, L.3 - p.57, L.17.) Mr. Shackelford 
then made an unsworn statement to the court explaining the three DOR violations he 
had received from 2001 to 2010. (39398 Tr., p.58, L.14 - p.63, L.13.) 
After hearing argument from Mr. Shackelford's counsel and a brief statement 
from Mr. Shackelford thanking his attorney, the court heard from the prosecutor. The 
prosecutor reminded the court of Mr. Shackelford's other convictions and sentences, 
referred the court to its original findings in support of the death penalty, noting the facts 
the court considered in 2001 to sentence Mr. Shackelford to death had not changed. 
(39398 Tr., p.65, L.8 - p.72, L.25; 27966 R., pp.3082-3115; 27966 Sentencing Tr., p.9, 
L.5 - p.960, L.9.) The prosecutor emphasized the testimony and letters from Bernadette 
Lasater, the letters from Martha Millar and Suzanne Ninichuck, Mr. Shackelford's prior 
record, and his propensity to use women, to support his request that the Court impose 
two fixed life sentences. (39398 Tr., p.67, L.19 - p.72, L.18; UPSI, attached letters from 
Ms. Lasater, Ms. Ninichuck, and email from Ms. Millar; 27966 Sentencing Tr., p.265, 
L.12 - p.407, L. 14 (Ms. Lasater testimony); 27966 Sentencing Tr., p.409, L.2 - p.469, 
L.10 (Ms. Millar testimony);27966 Trial Tr., p.2918, L.24 - p.3238, L.21 (Ms. Millar 
testimony); 27966 Trial Tr., p.3241, L.25 - p.3589, L.2 (Ms. Lasater testimony)). 
The court acquiesced: 
Having seen you in the way that I did, and heard the evidence 
that I heard, and seen the presentence reports and all the 
4 
documentation that went along with that, I thought the death penalty 
was the appropriate sentence in your case. 
But having found that the ultimate sanction was, or would 
have been appropriate for the crimes that you committed, I don't 
think it should come as any surprise that I'm imposing fixed life 
sentences for the murders of Donna Fontaine and Fred Palahniuk. 
My goal in sentencing, Mr. Shackelford, is that you not be released 
into society again. And I am ordering that those sentences be served 
consecutively. So, unless there be any confusion on the part of the 
Department of Parole's point, I hope you don't get out again. 
You are very bright. You are very charming. But you used your 
intelligence and your charm in, as I characterized before, unspeakable 
ways, and I therefore think that the fixed life sentence is the appropriate 
sentence for you. 
(39398 Tr., p.73, L.21 - p.74, L.23 (emphasis added); 27966 R., pp.3082-3115; 27966 
Sentencing Tr., p.9, L.5 - p.960, L.9 (2001 Aggravation/mitigation hearing.) 
Mr. Shackelford timely appealed. 
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ISSUES 
I. Whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to disqualify itself from 
sentencing Mr. Shackelford 
II. Whether the district court erred in considering testimony not subject to 
confrontation and cross-examination in sentencing Mr. Shackelford 
Ill. Whether the district court abused its discretion in considering victim impact 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Disqualify Itself From 
Sentencing Mr. Shackelford 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Shackelford asked the Honorable John Stegner, the judge who sentenced 
him to die in 2001 for two counts of first-degree murder, be disqualified from sentencing 
him again. Mr. Shackelford sought disqualification due to Judge Stegner's bias or 
prejudice against him and his case, formed when the judge was exposed to a broad 
range of inadmissible and unreliable evidence at the first sentencing that would not or 
should not be admitted or considered at the resentencing. The district court denied the 
motion to disqualify, finding it was not biased or prejudiced against Mr. Shackelford to a 
degree that would render him unable to fairly and impartially conduct sentencing. For 
the reasons explained below, the district court abused its discretion in denying 
Mr. Shackelford's for cause disqualification motion. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Disqualify Itself From 
Sentencing Mr. Shackelford 
The district court's prior exposure to inadmissible, unreliable and prejudicial 
information about Mr. Shackelford and his case rendered the court unable to fairly and 
impartially sentence Mr. Shackelford for two counts of first-degree murder. A judge who 
is biased or prejudiced for or against a party or the party's case is disqualified from 
presiding in that case. Idaho Criminal Rule (1.C.R.) 25(b) provides a judge may be 
disqualified from presiding in any action where the judge "is biased or prejudiced for or 
against any party of that party's case in the action." Here, Judge Stegner's prior 
exposure to prejudicial, unreliable and inadmissible information about Mr. Shackelford 
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and his case, by both presiding over Mr. Shackelford's 2001 capital sentencing, as well 
as the sentencings of Mr. Shackelford's co-defendants, prejudiced or biased Judge 
Stegner to the extent he could not fairly and impartially perform the legal analysis to 
sentence Mr. Shackelford in 2011. 
A defendant's entitlement to a fair and impartial judge is a guarantee of 
constitutional dimension. "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due 
process ... . "In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Due process thus "entitles a 
person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases." 
Marshall v. Jerrica, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). When analyzing a judicial-bias claim 
under the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has held that the question is "not 
whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his 
position is 'likely' to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional 'potential for 
bias."' Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009). Under this 
approach, courts are instructed to make "a realistic appraisal of psychological 
tendencies and human weakness" even of judges who are otherwise rightly presumed 
to be impartial. Id. at 883 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). Only an 
objective standard can provide "adequate protection against a judge who simply 
misreads or misapprehends the real motives at work in deciding the case." Id. 
The Due Process guarantee to a fair and impartial judge is memorialized in Idaho 
Criminal Rule 25(b), which permits any party to disqualify a judge from presiding in any 
action if the judge is biased or prejudiced for or against any party or that party's case. A 
court's decision granting or denying a defendant's motion to disqualify based on bias or 
prejudice under l.C.R. 25(b) is one of discretion. State v. Pratt, 128 Idaho 207, 210 
(1996) (citing State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 215 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1073 
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(1989)); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 205-06 (1987) (whether judge's involvement in 
defendant's case requires disqualification from further participation is left to sound 
discretion of trial judge). In reviewing a district court's decision denying disqualification, 
the appellate court must consider whether the district court correctly perceived the issue 
to be one of discretion, whether the court acted within the boundaries of that discretion 
and consistent with applicable law, and whether the court reached its decision through 
an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). 
In moving to disqualify Judge Stegner from sentencing him, Mr. Shackelford 
identified the following facts that would prevent Judge Stegner from applying legal 
standards to his case in a fair and impartial manner: (1) Judge Stegner presided over 
the criminal proceedings of Mr. Shackelford's co-defendants, Bernadette Lasater, 
Martha Millar, Mary Abitz, and Sonja Abitz (Sonja); (2) During Sonja sentencing, Judge 
Stegner acknowledged Sonja's statements following her arrest was some of the most 
incriminating testimony against Mr. Shackelford even though the statement was not 
elicited at Mr. Shackelford's trial (27966/31928 Supplemental R. Vol.Ill, pp.500, 502 
(State v. Sonja Abtiz, Latah County Case No. CR00-00263, Sentencing Tr., p.42, Ls.3-
11 ("[T]his statement [from Sonya Abitz, State's Exhibit 1 to her PSI] is some of the 
most incriminating testimony ... against Dale Shackelford. It didn't come out at trial.")); 
and (3) having presided over Mr. Shackelford's 2001 sentencing, as well as the 
sentencings of Mr. Shackelford's co-defendants, Judge Stegner had formed the opinion 
that Mr. Shackelford manipulated, deceived, and coerced others to commit acts they 
would not otherwise do. (R.39398, pp.64-66; 27966/31928 Supplemental R. Vol.Ill, 
pp.500, 502 (State v. Lasater, Latah County Case No. CR00-00264, Sentencing Tr., 
p.29, Ls.22-24).) 
9 
Judge Stegner also considered and was exposed to numerous statements 
constituting testimonial hearsay that were not subject to cross-examination in violation 
of Mr. Shackelford's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. (R.39398, p.67; 
27966/31928 Supplemental R. Vol.Ill, pp.500, 502 (State v. Sonja Abtiz, Latah County 
Case No. CR00-00263, Sentencing Tr., p.42, Ls.3-11).) In addition, Judge Stegner was 
privy to the confidential and privileged trial notes of defense counsel that were disclosed 
to the judge during post-conviction proceedings for an in-camera determination of 
whether the notes should be provided to the State. (R.39398, p.68; 27966/31928 
Supplemental R., pp. 120, 137-38) Finally, Judge Stegner was exposed to 
impermissible and inflammatory victim impact statements in the original PSI, including 
recommendations from Fred Palahniuk's brother and son that Mr. Shackelford be 
sentenced to death. (R.39398, pp.69-70; R.27966, PSI, pp.5-6.) In sum, the 
overwhelming volume and nature of Judge Stegner's exposure to impermissible, 
inflammatory and prejudicial information about Mr. Shackelford would make it 
impossible for him to fairly and impartially sentence Mr. Shackelford. 
In denying the disqualification motion, the court acknowledged having reviewed 
the information cited by counsel but concluded Crawford did not apply to sentencing 
evidence, and if the court had been prejudiced against Mr. Shackelford, it would not 
have vacated his two death sentences. (39398 Tr., p.26, Ls.17-24.) The court 
acknowledged reviewing defense counsel's notes in post-conviction proceedings, but 
stated that it had "probably forgotten more about this case than I knew at one time." 
(39398 Tr., p.27, Ls.6-20.) 
The circumstances of this case are not unlike those in State v. Lankford, 127 
Idaho 608 (1995). In Lankford, the defendant agreed to cooperate with the State in the 
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prosecution of his brother; in exchange, the State agreed not to seek death and to 
recommend an indeterminate life sentence. Id. at 612-13. Despite the State's 
agreement and written notice that it would not seek death, the district court imposed a 
death sentence. Id. at 612. The defendant successfully challenged his sentence on 
appeal and the matter was set for a new sentencing. Id. On the defendant's motion, the 
original sentencing judge was disqualified and at the county prosecutor's request, the 
attorney general's office was appointed to prosecute the case. Id. Thereafter, the 
prosecutor filed notice of intent to seek death. Id. The defendant moved to strike the 
State's notice based on the prior plea agreement. Id. The district court reviewed the 
record and findings of the prior judge, including the State's indeterminate life sentence 
recommendations in exchange for the defendant's cooperation, which the defendant 
had already provided. Id. The district court found the agreement to be enforceable at 
the resentencing and found the defendant had made a sufficient showing of 
vindictiveness in seeking the death penalty, which the State had failed to rebut. Id. at 
613. Although the district court struck the notice, it concluded the State could still 
present evidence in aggravation under the agreement, which did not preclude the court 
from imposing a death sentence. Id. At the sentencing hearing, the state presented 
evidence in aggravation and the court found statutory aggravating circumstances, but 
concluded none outweighed the mitigation, and imposed two consecutive fixed life 
sentences. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant argued he was entitled either to sentencing by a judge 
untainted by the State's request for the death penalty, or to the appellate court's 
imposition of the State's original sentencing recommendation. Id. at 615. The Idaho 
Supreme Court rejected the latter suggestion, but recognized other cases where the 
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prosecution had made a harsher sentencing recommendation than it had agreed to in a 
plea agreement, causing the cases to be remanded either for specific performance or 
withdrawal of the guilty plea. Id. at 616. Where specific performance was the remedy 
sought, it included resentencing by a different judge. Id. at 616 (citing Santobel/o v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971) (describing specific performance to include 
sentencing by a different judge); State v. Persak, 847 P.2d 280, 282 (Mont.1993) 
(upholding order for resentencing before a judge untainted by the State's 
recommendation outside the plea agreement); Stone v. Cupp, 592 P.2d 1044, 1046 
(Or. App. 1979) (when State breached plea agreement sentencing recommendation, 
case remanded for sentencing before a different judge where State makes a 
recommendation consistent with plea agreement)). 
The Lankford Court found the defendant's case distinguishable because the 
impropriety of the State's death notice was discovered before sentencing occurred. Id. 
Nevertheless, because the district court allowed the State to present aggravating 
evidence, thus taking a position inconsistent with the plea agreement, the presentation 
of such evidence by the State was erroneous, requiring the defendant's sentences to be 
vacated. Id. at 617. On remand, 
[s]o there can be no suggestion that the sentence ultimately imposed on 
remand, whatever it may be, is in any way a product of the residual effects 
of the state's submission of aggravating evidence and arguments, 
resentencing shall be by a judge who has not heard the evidence or 
arguments. 
Id. at 618. 
Although the State did not breach a plea agreement in Mr. Shackelford's case, 
the State did submit notice of its intent not to seek a death sentence to the same judge 
who had already sentenced Mr. Shackelford to death following a lengthy penalty phase 
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sentencing trial in 2001. (27966 Tr., p.9, L.5 - p.960, L.9; R.27966, pp.3082-3115.) 
Once the State submitted notice of its intent not to seek death again, the district court 
should have disqualified itself from presiding over the resentencing based on its prior 
knowledge of the sought punishment, the evidence it found to support the sought 
punishment, and its actual imposition of death. 
The district court abused its discretion and denied Mr. Shackelford Due Process 
when it refused to disqualify itself and instead proceeded to sentence Mr. Shackelford. 
This Court should vacate Mr. Shackelford's sentences and remand his case for 
resentencing before a judge who has not been exposed to the prejudicial sentencing 
information about Mr. Shackelford. 
II. 
The District Court Erred In Considering Testimony Not Subject To Confrontation And 
Cross-Examination In Sentencing Mr. Shackelford 
A. Introduction 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution guarantees "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . 
. . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]" U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis 
added). The historical background against which the text of the Sixth Amendment was 
drafted and adopted makes clear criminal prosecutions include more than the guilt 
phase of a trial, embracing sentencing within the purview of the right to confront and 
cross-examine. As a result, testimony offered by the State in support of two fixed life 
sentences was subject to the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and cross-
examination, and the district court's refusal to require such protections was error 
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requiring Mr. Shackelford's sentences be vacated and his case remanded for 
resentencing before a different judge. 
B. Standard of Review 
Constitutional questions are questions of pure law, and therefore are reviewed de 
nova by this Court. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 67 (2001 ). 
C. The District Court Erred In Considering Testimony Not Subject To Confrontation 
And Cross-Examination In Sentencing Mr. Shackelford To Two Fixed Life 
Sentences 
At the urging of the prosecutor, the district court sentenced Mr. Shackelford to 
two fixed life sentences after having reviewed, inter alia, statements from the assistant 
prosecuting attorney from Madison County, Missouri, R. Scott Killen, a statement from 
Bernadette Lasater which included correspondence between Ms. Lasater and 
Mr. Shackelford, and a statement from Martha Millar, all of which were attached to the 
UPSI. (39398 Tr., p.69, L.13 - p. 72, L.18.) These statements were created and 
submitted at the prosecutor's request, and were not a product of the presentence 
investigator's efforts. (39398 Tr., p.48, Ls.5-22.) Ms. Lasater and Ms. Miller were 
Mr. Shackelford's co-conspirators for the underlying offense of conspiracy to commit 
murder. Neither of their statements, nor the statements of the Missouri prosecutor, were 
subject to cross-examination as none of the witnesses appeared in person at 
Mr. Shackelford's sentencing, despite Mr. Shackelford's objection to the district court's 
consideration of the letters and statements on Sixth Amendment Confrontation grounds. 
(R.39398, p.90.) 
The Sixth Amendment requires any testimony submitted by the State in support 
of a fixed sentence greater than the minimum be presented in open court and subject to 
the crucible of cross-examination. 
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1. The Plain Language Of The Sixth Amendment, Considered In Its Historical 
Context, Demonstrates The Framers' Intent That The Right To Confrontation 
Extend to Sentencing 
By its plain language, considered in light of the history surrounding its ratification, 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution defines the scope of the right to 
confront witnesses to include sentencing or punishment. The Sixth Amendment 
provides that 
[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process of obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
The only provisions of the Sixth Amendment which are subject to application in 
all criminal prosecutions are the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation, the right to confront witnesses, the right to compel favorable witnesses to 
appear, and the right to counsel. The remaining provisions are, by the language of the 
amendment, limited to trial, i.e., the right to a speedy, public trial, not a speedy, public 
criminal prosecution. 
At the time the Sixth Amendment was ratified by the states, "criminal 
prosecution" had a historical meaning far broader than the means by which charges 
were formally brought against an individual. At common law, Sir William Blackstone 
characterized "criminal prosecution" as the "regular and ordinary method of proceeding 
in the courts of the criminal jurisdiction" under 
twelve general heads, following each other in a progressive order, viz: 1. 
Arrest; 2.Commitment, and bail; 3. Prosecution; 4. Process; 5. 
Arraignment, and its incidents; 6. Plea, and issues; 7. Trial, and 
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conviction; 8. Clergy; 9. Judgment, and its consequences; 10. Reversal of 
judgment; 11. Reprieve, or pardon; 12. Execution .... 
4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 288, 288-406 (1765-1769) 
(hereinafter BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES); id. at 375 ("We are now to consider the next 
stage of criminal prosecution, after trial and conviction are past, in such crimes and 
misdemeanors as are either too high or too low to be included within the benefit of 
clergy: which is that of judgment."). When imposing judgment as part of the criminal 
prosecution, "the court must pronounce that judgment which the law hath annexed to 
the crime, and which hath been constantly mentioned, together with the crime itself, in 
some or other of the former chapters." 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES at 376. 
At common law, a distinction was drawn between a conviction and judgment, 
particularly because the disabilities associated with a criminal conviction did not attach 
until judgment was rendered. Prior to the entry of judgment, the potential consequences 
flowing from a conviction could still be avoided . 
. . . for there is great difference between a man convicted and attainted: 
though they are frequently through inaccuracy confounded together. After 
conviction only a man is liable to none of these disabilities; for there is still 
in contemplation of law a possibility of his innocence. Something may be 
offered in arrest of judgment; the indictment may be erroneous, which will 
render his guilt uncertain, and thereupon the present conviction may be 
quashed: he may obtained a pardon, or be allowed the benefit of clergy: 
both which suppose some latent sparks of merit, which plead in 
extenuation of his fault. But when judgment is once pronounced, both law 
and fact conspire to prove him completely guilty; and there is not the 
remotely possibility left of anything to be said in his favour. 
4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES at 380-81. "There now remains nothing to speak of but 
execution; the completion of human punishment." Id. at 403. "[H]aving thus arrived at 
the last stage of criminal proceedings, or execution, the end and completion of human 
punishment, which was the sixth and last head to be considered under the division of 
public wrongs, the fourth and last object of the laws of England[.]" Id. at 406. Thus, at 
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the time the Sixth Amendment was drafted and ratified, the common law understanding 
of "criminal prosecutions" included sentencing. See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE 
AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16 (Washington, D.C. 1931) 
(restating the essentials of a criminal proceeding to include sentencing); Commonwealth 
v. Duane, 1 Binn. 601 (Pa. 1809) (Act prohibiting "prosecution by indictment" for a 
common law offense from date of the Act's passage and thereafter, ends the 
prosecution of one who was tried and found guilty prior to the Act's passage because 
the judgment is part of the prosecution by indictment). 
In addition, by the time the Sixth Amendment was drafted and ratified by the 
States, individual states had already drafted and adopted their own constitutions, a 
majority of which included a confrontation clause.2 The right of a person in a capital or 
criminal prosecution to confront his accuser or witnesses against him was included in 
the overwhelming majority of state constitutions. See Bill Schwartz, 1 THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 235 (1971) (hereinafter Schwartz) (Virginia 
Declaration of Rights, art. 8 ("That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a 
right ... to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses .... ")); id. at 265 
(Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, art. IX ("That in all prosecutions for criminal 
offences, a man hath a right ... to be confronted with the witnesses, to call for evidence 
in his favour .... ")); id. at 278 (Delaware Declaration of Rights, § 14 ("That in all 
prosecutions for criminal offences, every man hath a right ... to be confronted with the 
accusers or witnesses .... ")); id. at 282 (Maryland Declaration of Rights, art. XIX 
2 The enforcement of the right to confrontation in colonial America is not surprising 
given that the right to confront one's accusers "dates back to Roman times." Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004). As a result, the right to confrontation was part and 
parcel of the common law brought from England. Id. 
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("That, in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to be confronted with 
witnesses against him .... ")); id. at 287 (North Carolina Declaration of Rights, art. VII 
("That, in all criminal prosecutions, every man has a right ... to confront the accusers 
and witnesses with other testimony .... ")); id. at 323 (Vermont Declaration of Rights, 
Ch.I, art. X ("That, in all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man hath a right ... to be 
confronted with the witnesses ... . "));id. at 342, 371 (Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, Ch. 1, art. XII ("And every subject shall have a right ... to meet the witnesses 
against him face to face .... ")); id. at 377 (New Hampshire Bill of Rights, art. XV ("And 
every subject shall have a right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face ... 
. "). 
Other states' constitutions included provisions that could be argued implicitly 
included protection of the right to confrontation. 3 Id. at 260 (New Jersey Const. art. XVI 
("That all criminals shall be admitted to the same privileges of witnesses and counsel, 
as their prosecutors are or shall be entitled to.")); id. at 298 (Georgia Constitution, art. 
XLI ("The jury shall be judges of law, as well as of fact .... ")); id. at 311 (New York 
Constitution, art. XXXV ("[S]uch parts of the common law of England, and of the statute 
law of England and Great Britain, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of New 
York, as together did form the law the said colony on [April 19, 1775] shall be and 
continue the law of this State .... ")). 
Considering the plain language of the Sixth Amendment, the historical context in 
which it was ratified by the states, as well as the express inclusion of the right to 
confrontation in a majority of state constitutions, it is clear the right to confrontation was 
3 Only two state constitutions were completely silent on the issue of confrontation. 
Schwartz, supra, at 325-36 (South Carolina); id. at 289-90 (Connecticut Declaration of 
Rights, art. 1 (readopting its colonial charter)). 
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considered an indispensible right both in colonial and post-revolutionary America. 
Moreover, because most colonies had recognized the right to confrontation before the 
Revolution and before they had adopted their own constitutions containing an explicit 
confrontation guarantee, colonial America's experience with criminal prosecutions 
informed what was understood by the Sixth Amendment guarantee of confrontation. 
Based on its analysis of the history of confrontation, both at common law and 
early post-revolutionary America, the United States Supreme Court reached two 
conclusions about the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation: first, it was directed at 
the principal evil of using ex parte examinations as evidence against an accused, i.e., 
testimonial hearsay; and second, "the Framers would not have allowed admission of 
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was 
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-54 (2004). 
A substantial reason for the Framers' adoption of the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation through in-person cross-examination stemmed from a healthy distrust of 
judges and other government officials. 
We have no doubt that the courts below were acting in utmost good faith 
when they found reliability. The Framers, however, would not have been 
content to indulge in this assumption. They knew that judges, like other 
government officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of 
the people; the likes of the dread Lord Jeffreys were not yet too distant a 
memory. They were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67 (citations omitted). 
Although acknowledging it was leaving open the question of what constituted a 
testimonial statement, the Court found that at a minimum, it applied to prior testimony at 
a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and statements elicited 
during police interrogations. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Specifically, the Court held that 
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the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause guaranteed a defendant the right to 
confront those who bear testimony against him. Id. at 51. The Crawford Court thus 
established the framework for evaluating Confrontation Clause claims, determining as a 
general matter the Confrontation Clause is "most naturally read as a reference to the 
right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the 
time of the founding." Id. at 54. 
2. Because Punishment Often Automatically Attached Upon Conviction Of A 
Serious Offense In Colonial America, The Right To Confrontation That Attached 
To Trial Attached To Sentencing By Default 
Prior to and during the time of our Nation's founding, crime and punishment were 
matters generally handled by each of the colonies; there was no federal government, 
only the British Parliament and Crown and the officials who were beholden to them. 
Over time, the colonists came to resent and distrust the Crown, which was perceived to 
be tyrannical in its governance of the colonies. See Bernard Schwartz, 1 THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 49-52, 199 (1971) (noting that had the mother country 
continued to treat the colonies with "a wise and salutary neglect," rather than asserting 
imperial power after the end of the French and Indian War, the United States may not 
have come to be); NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 23 (Washington D.C. 1931) ("America was colonized by 
Englishmen who had had a bad experience of seventeenth-century English legislation 
and seventeenth-century law enforcement under the Stuarts, and had been taught to 
think of the jury as standing between them and royal tyranny. Again, on the eve of the 
Revolution, the local jury in more than one colony was a safeguard against enforcement 
of obnoxious legislation by royal governors."). 
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The colonists' distrust of government officials extended not only to governors and 
political leaders under the control of the Crown, but also to judges who were perceived 
to be inextricably intertwined with the interests of England and the Crown, not the 
colonists. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968); see also Resolution of the 
Continental Congress, October 19, 1765 (declaration to "His Majesty's Person and 
Government" of the essential rights and liberties of the colonists, including "[t]hat Trial 
by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies," 
and maintaining that Stamp Act duties, as well as other duties, and the extension of 
jurisdiction of the Admiralty Courts beyond its ancient limits subverted the rights and 
liberties of colonists) (available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th century/resolu65.asp); 
Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, October 14, 1774 ("And 
whereas ... judges, who before held only estates at will in their office, have been made 
dependant on the crown alone for their salaries . . . And whereas it has lately been 
resolved in parliament, that by force of statute . . . colonists may be transported to 
England, and tried there upon accusations for treasons and misprisions, or 
concealments of treasons committed in the colonies, and by a late statute, such trials 
have been directed in cases therein mentioned .") (available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th century/resolves.asp); id. Resolution N.C.D. 5 ("That the 
respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to 
the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, 
according to the course of that law."); Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776 
(objecting to the King making "judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their 
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries," to protecting armed British 
troops from punishment for murders of the inhabitants of the state by mock trials, to 
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depriving them in many cases of the benefits of trial by jury, and for transporting them 
"beyond seas to be tried for pretended offenses . . .") (available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th century/declare.asp). 
The colonists were: 
endowed with the two essentials of the English Constitution: A representative 
legislative assembly and recognition of the basic rights of Englishmen. More 
than that, the establishment of such essentials in written fundamental laws or 
documents in the form of Charters granted from London had a profound 
influence on American constitutional ideas . 
. . . The charters received from London ... could be amended or revoked at 
the will of the grantor. In law, they remained only medieval grants, subject to 
the will of the grantor, though they regulated the lives and property of ever-
increasing thousands of Americans. 
Schwartz, supra, at 50. 
It was against this backdrop that the jury trial garnered both federal and state 
protection through the United States Constitution and the constitutions of the individual 
states. 
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions 
reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be 
enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal 
defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government. Those who 
wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that it was 
necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to 
eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of 
higher authority. The framers of the constitutions strove to create an 
independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary 
action. Proving an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers 
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous 
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the 
defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more 
tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was 
to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in the Federal and State 
Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official 
power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberly of 
the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power, 
so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found 
expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community 
parlicipation in the determination of guilt or innocence. The deep 
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commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious cases as a 
defense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must 
therefore be respect by the States. 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S 145, 155-56 (1968) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
It is clear that even before the founding of our nation, our forefathers regarded 
the jury as a bulwark against an oppressive government, including judges. The 
development and acknowledgement of our Nation's and forefathers' respect for the 
incontrovertible right of an accused to place his fate in the hands of a jury of his peers, 
in the vicinage of the offense, is integral to understanding why the right of confrontation 
does not end at the guilty verdict's doorstep. 
[T]hese several stages [of criminal prosecution] have developed and taken 
shape along with a system of constitutional guaranties and mitigating 
devices, chiefly as protections to accused persons, and as a result of 
contests between the courts and the Crown in Stuart England at the time 
of colonization, when we took over English institutions. But they developed 
and took shape, also, with reference to a time when all serious crimes 
were punishable with death. 
It is worth while to note some of the reasons for the extravagant 
powers of criminal juries in so many of the States. Colonial tribunals were 
largely manned by laymen and lay judges obtained in some States till well 
into the nineteenth century. There was no substantial difference in 
training, competence, experience, or intelligence between judges and jury. 
Also the colonists had had a bad experience of judges in the political and 
religious prosecutions in the nadir of English justice under the Stuarts. In 
some colonies there had been a bad experience of royal judges, and after 
the Federal Constitution there was a bad experience of masterful 
federalist judges. 
NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
18, 27 (Washington D.C. 1931). 
Jury sentencing, once common in American courts, has been 
condemned by every national crime commission and major sentencing-
law reform study since 1930. 
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The original reasons for jury sentencing in America included 
colonial distrust of judges appointed by the Crown, a democratic faith in 
citizen involvement in the justice system, and the general lack of 
differences in training and competence between the judge and the jury 
during much of the nineteenth century. 
Sanford H. Kadish, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1465 (N.Y. The Free Press 
1983); see also Note: Statutory Structures for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 1134, 1155-56 (1960) ("At common law, sanctions were assessed by the court 
in all cases and jury sentencing in this country is said to be a reaction to the harsh 
penalties imposed by royal judges in England in the colonies, and the early distrust of 
government power. The practice was further supported by the lack of substantial 
difference in training, competence, or intelligence between colonial judges and juries."). 
That jury sentencing in serious criminal cases was either de facto or explicitly the 
rule, not the exception, at the birth of our nation has been acknowledged by the 
Supreme Court: 
Thus, with respect to the criminal law of felonious conduct, "the English 
trial judge of the later eighteenth century had very little explicit discretion in 
sentencing. The substantive criminal law tended to be sanction-specific; it 
prescribed a particular sentence for each offense. The judge was meant 
simply to impose that sentence (unless he thought in the circumstances 
that the sentence was so inappropriate that he should invoke the pardon 
process to commute it)." Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the 
Eve of the French Revolution, in The Trial Jury in England, France, 
Germany 1700-1900, pp. 36-37 (A. Schiappa ed.1987). As Blackstone, 
among many others, has made clear, "[t]he judgment, though pronounced 
or awarded by the judges, is not their determination or sentence, but the 
determination and sentence of the law." 3 Blackstone 396 (emphasis 
deleted). 
As in Williams [v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)], our periodic recognition 
of judges' broad discretion in sentencing-since the 19th-century shift in this 
country from statutes providing fixed-term sentences to those providing 
judges discretion within a permissible range, Note, The Admissibility of 
Character Evidence in Determining Sentence, 9 U. Chi. L.Rev. 715 
(1942)-has been regularly accompanied by the qualification that that 
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discretion was bound by the range of sentencing options prescribed by the 
legislature. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 
589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972) (agreeing that "[t]he Government is also on 
solid ground in asserting that a sentence imposed by a federal district 
judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject to review" 
(emphasis added)); Williams, 337 U.S., at 246, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079 
(explaining that, in contrast to the guilt stage of trial, the judge's task in 
sentencing is to determine, "within fixed statutory or constitutional limits[,] 
the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt" has been 
resolved). 
The historic link between verdict and judgment and the consistent 
limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the limits of the legal 
penalties provided highlight the novelty of a legislative scheme that 
removes the jury from the determination of a fact that, if found, exposes 
the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would 
receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict 
alone. 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 479-80, 481-83 (2000); accord Deborah Young, 
Fact-Finding at Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the Rules, 79 CORNELL L. 
REV. 199, 306-36 (1994); cf. 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES at 238 (recognizing that 
juries often mitigated a defendant's punishment for theft, which under common law and 
throughout Europe was death for anything valued at twelvepence or more, by finding 
him guilty of theft of less than twelvepence, and characterizing the juries' actions as 
"pious perjury"). 
Many commentators and scholars have similarly recognized the historical role 
juries played in determining sentences in criminal cases. 
In colonial times, and particularly in the period before American 
independence, juries were de facto sentencers with substantial power. 
Many crimes were capital offenses. The result was binary--guilty and 
death, or not guilty and freedom. There were few scalable punishments, or 
punishments involving a term of years. This is so because penitentiaries 
were not common until the end of the eighteenth century. Jurors plainly 
understood the impact of a guilty verdict on the defendant because of the 
relative simplicity of the criminal law and its penalty structure, and often 
because of the process by which they were selected. They were picked 
from the rolls of white men with property. Indeed, steps were sometimes 
taken to secure better qualified people to serve on juries. Juries were 
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hardly representative in the sense that we understand today. The 
substantive criminal law was the province of the states, and was, for the 
most part, state common law, often deriving from cases with which the 
jurors were familiar. 
Like the modern jury, colonial jurors were authorized to give a general 
verdict without explanation, but unlike the modern jury, the colonial jury 
was explicitly permitted to find both the facts and the law. If capital 
punishment were inappropriate, they would simply decline to find guilt, or 
find the defendant guilty of a lesser crime in order to avoid the penalty of 
death. No one disparaged this as "jury nullification." Ignoring the law to 
effect a more lenient outcome was well within the jury's role. In fact, 
several colonies explicitly provided for jury sentencing. 
Thus, in the colonial division of labor, juries had a preeminent role. There 
was no need for a priori punishment standards or rules, because there 
was, for the most part, a single punishment. Penal philosophy, at least as 
a formal matter, was retributive. There was little national federal law, even 
after independence. Most criminal law derived from the common law and 
in time, statutes from state legislatures--law with which jurors were 
familiar. 
The turn of the nineteenth century brought scalable punishments--
penitentiaries and, in time, reformatories--and thus, a more complex set of 
sentencing outcomes. The jury could no longer link conviction to a 
particular sentence even if it had the power to sentence or decide 
questions of law--and it did not. Now, they were explicitly instructed to find 
only the facts; judges determined the applicable law. Federal substantive 
criminal law began to evolve, although most criminal prosecutions were 
still state-based. And the jury changed: it was more diverse as barriers to 
serving as jurors were lifted for minorities and women, as were property 
restrictions. With more and more access to education, a professional class 
of judges and lawyers evolved, and with it, the power of the jury declined, 
including the power to affect the sentence. 
Over time, a different division of labor evolved as between judges and 
juries: juries decided liability; judges sentenced. Selection procedures 
sought to insure that the jury would be selected in direct proportion to what 
they did not know about the issues, or the parties. And that was not too 
difficult in an urbanizing, diverse country. Juries became more and more 
passive, deferring to the professional judge. 
Judge Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too 
Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 692-95 (2010) (footnotes 
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omitted); Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 455 (1996) (footnotes omitted) (although acknowledging the 
dearth of research on the topic, recognizing what is known shows "early colonial juries 
had authority to indirectly determine sentencing much as the early English jury did. 
Furthermore, some colonies conferred on juries greater authority to indirectly determine 
sentences in criminal cases explicitly. Even toward the middle of the twentieth century, 
state statutes authorized juries to determine sentencing in capital and non-capital 
cases. Thus, as in England, the American jury frequently played a broader role in the 
trial process by determining criminal sanction and as well as issues of guilt or 
innocence."); Young, supra, at 305. 
While the role of the jury in sentencing and punishment decisions has 
unquestionably diminished over time to the comparatively anemic role it holds today, the 
jury played a prominent role in sentencing and punishment in the colonies and States 
early in our Nation's history. WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., 1 CRIM. PROC. § 1.6(8) (3d. ed. 
2011.) To mitigate harsh punishments, grand jurors would often downgrade charges to 
non-capital offenses, and juries would convict of lesser offenses, having full knowledge 
of the penalties designated for the charged and lesser offenses. Id.; Young, supra, at 
306-07. Thus, in matters of punishment and sentencing during colonial times and our 
nation's founding, juries exercised real power while judges imposed sentences 
predetermined either by the guilt phase verdict or by juries, engaging in a predominantly 
ministerial function in sentencing. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478-80 
(2000) (recognizing in felony cases that judges did not determine sentences at common 
law, but simply imposed the sentence attached to the particular offense, while juries 
acquitted or found a defendant guilty of a lesser offense to mitigate punishment). 
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Where punishment was either inherent in a verdict or was determined by a jury, 
the right to confrontation in colonial times and at our Nation's founding necessarily 
extended to sentencing. It is undisputed that from colonial times through the present 
day, excluding a brief flirtation with judicial reliability determinations in lieu of 
confrontation,4 an accused in this country has always had the right to confront and 
cross-examine the witnesses against him in a criminal trial. Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 42-60 (2004) (documenting common law, colonial and post-revolutionary 
history of the right to confrontation and asserting Supreme Court case law has been 
"faithful to the Framer's understanding: [t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent 
from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where 
the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross examine." (footnote omitted)); Motes 
v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900) (stating the Constitution "must control the 
action of the courts of the United States in all criminal prosecutions before them," and 
holding the Sixth Amendment right of an accused to be confronted with witnesses 
against him prohibits the United States from using a deposition or statement of an 
absent witness against the accused at trial). In pre- and post-revolutionary America, 
where punishment was either inherent in the verdict or decided by juries based on the 
evidence presented during the criminal trial, the right to confrontation inherently 
extended to sentencing for serious offenses. 
3. Separating Sentencing Proceedings From The Criminal Trial, The Declining Role 
Of Juries, And The Changing Purposes Of Sentencing Did Not And Could Not 
Abrogate The Constitutional Right To Confrontation At Sentencing 
4 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (Sixth Amendment right to confrontation 
not violated by admission of unavailable witness's statement against an accused so 
long as the court determines the statement bears sufficient "indicia of reliability"), 
overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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The power of juries in pre- and post-revolutionary America was not only evident 
in its inherent sentencing authority, but also in its substantive authority in the criminal 
law arena. Early on in our Nation's history, juries had the power, if not the right, to 
determine both the law and the facts in criminal cases, often disregarding instructions 
from judges. Compare Douglas G. Smith, the Historical and Constitutional Contexts of 
Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 446-454 (1996) (concluding that "in the early 
years of the Republic, the jury was recognized as possessing the power to judge both 
issues of law as well as issues of fact," but this power disappeared as the legal system 
changed from a layman's practice to that of professionals learned in the law), and Mark 
DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939) 
(cataloging cases reflecting that in our Nation's first fifty years, jurors had the power to 
decide both law and facts, and noting the current trend of depriving jurors of the power 
to decide the law was contrary to state statutes and state constitutional provisions), and 
Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670) (after jury acquitted William Penn of 
unlawful assembly, despite evidence of his guilt, jurors were fined for disregarding the 
court's instructions and "overwhelming evidence" that should have resulted in guilt; juror 
who refused to pay the fine was sent to prison, and on appeal, the court held jurors 
could not be punished by judges for their verdicts, but could be liable for attaint, 
whereby a second jury could convict and punish the first jury for rendering a false 
verdict), with Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry Into the Right of Criminal Juries to 
Determine the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 11 (1998) 
(arguing the historical evidence does not support the claim that jurors had the right to 
decide the law, although acknowledging they may have had the power to do so). By 
1851, nine states had declared either by constitution or statute that juries had the right 
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to decide questions of law, while jurors in six additional states had established either 
through judicial decision or practice that juries had the power to do so. Albert W. 
Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 867, 903-916 (1994). 
Who would and should decide the law and who would decide fact became a 
power struggle between jurors and judges. Not surprisingly, most courts passing on the 
question decided judges, not jurors, should settle questions of law. Id. at 910 (identifying 
courts in eleven states which had rejected the right of jurors to decide the law between 
1850 and 1931). The power struggle between judges and juries on questions of law 
ended with the United States Supreme Court decision in Spart v. United States, 156 
U.S. 51 (1895). In Spart, the Court held jurors are bound by a judge's instructions 
regarding the law but jurors are the exclusive judges of facts, rejecting the principle that 
jurors had the right and power to decide both. Id. at 106-07. Resolution of the struggle 
between juries and judges in deciding questions of law was but one of the ways in 
which the historical power of juries was diminished in favor of the judiciary. Another was 
sentencing. 
Over time, as definite punishments were divorced from serious offenses, 
sentencing took on a life of its own and became increasingly important. Beginning in the 
late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries, fixed punishments for serious offenses 
declined as state legislatures began adopting provisions that allowed for the imposition 
of sentences within a particular range set by the legislature. Nancy King & Susan Klein, 
Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1509-10 (2001); WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL, 1 
CRIM. PROC. § 1.6(c) (3d. ed. 2011) (noting the post-revolutionary period marked the 
beginning of a universal restructuring of sanctions, originating in Pennsylvania, by which 
30 
capital and corporal punishment were sharply reduced in favor of incarceration at a 
penitentiary for a period of time determined by a judge, or jury, within legislatively 
prescribed limits). The movement away from determinate sentencing toward 
indeterminate sentencing by a judge within legislatively established ranges was, in large 
part, due to the recognition that death and corporal punishment were disproportionate 
penalties which had little deterrent effect. Benjamin C. McMurray, Challenging Untested 
Facts at Sentencing: The Applicability of Crawford at Sentencing After Booker, 37 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 589, 592 & nn.11-15 (2006); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
466, 478-83 (2000). At the same time, indeterminate sentencing was driven by a new 
focus on the sentencing goals of rehabilitation and reformation, rather than retribution. 
Gertner, supra, at 424-25; Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). With 
rehabilitative goals in mind, the separation of conviction and sentencing became 
entrenched during the Progressive era in response to our deep uncertainty 
regarding free will. At trial the jury would determine guilt or innocence 
according to traditional, generally accepted notions of personal 
responsibility. At the sentencing phase, however, judges were to consider 
more individualized, explanatory, or mitigating factors such as the 
"defendant's background, upbringing, associates and so on---matters 
rarely formally admissible during the trial---became relevant." 
Sherman Clark, The Courage of our Convictions, 97 MICH. L.REV. 2381, 2444 (1999) 
(quoting Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound: 
An Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915, 1926 (1995)). 
Rather than fitting the crime, punishment came to fit the offender. As sentencing 
became individualized, the fate of an offender came to be seen more as a medical 
problem for specialists or experts, such as criminologists, psychologists, and judges to 
solve, not lay jurors. King & Klein, supra, at 1509-11; Comment, Consideration of 
Punishment by Juries, 17 U. CH1.l.REV. 400, 406 n.1 (1949) (concluding individualized 
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punishment is a problem for specialists, not a body representing a cross-section of the 
community, but recognizing statutes in thirteen states giving jurors absolute sentencing 
discretion within specified limits, and twenty-five different statutes which gave juries the 
right to decide between two specified penalties in certain cases); Gertner, supra, at 424-
25. 
With rehabilitation and reformation as the backdrop, judges took into 
consideration a broad range of factors for the purpose of fixing a "more enlightened and 
just sentence." Williams, 337 U.S. at 250-51. Judges were provided with a tremendous 
amount of information about an offender---far greater than anything presented during 
the guilt phase of a trial---which was not subject to strict evidentiary procedural limits. 
Id. at 246. The belief was that "by careful study of the lives and personalities of 
convicted offenders many could be less severely punished and restored sooner to 
complete freedom and useful citizenship." Id. at 249. Inherent in this belief was the 
notion that punishment would be less severe, not more severe by access to this 
information, and that probation agents creating presentence investigation reports 
containing testimonial hearsay "ha[d] not been trained to prosecute but to aid 
offenders." Id. at 249-50. It was by this reasoning that the Williams Court concluded the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not limit judges to only that 
information received in open court to impose sentence. Id. at 251. Although the Court 
acknowledged its prior precedent established the underlying philosophy of the Due 
Process Clause was to ensure no person was tried and convicted unless given 
reasonable notice of the charges against him, afforded an opportunity to examine 
adverse witnesses, offer evidence on his own behalf, and be represented by counsel, 
the Court deemed these protections applicable only when the information was 
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presented to determine a defendant's guilt. Id. at 245 (citing In re: Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 
273 (1948); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)). The Court concluded that to 
extend the Due Process Clause to require confrontation at sentencing "would hinder if 
not preclude all courts-state and federal-from making progressive efforts to improve the 
administration of justice." Id. 
We must recognize that most of the information now relied upon by judges 
to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences would be 
unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by 
witnesses subject to cross-examination. And the modern probation report 
draws on information concerning every aspect of a defendant's life. The 
type and extent of this information make totally impractical if not 
impossible open court testimony with cross-examination. Such a 
procedure could endlessly delay criminal administration in a retrial of 
collateral issues. 
Id. at 250 (footnote omitted). The Williams Court's elevation of concerns of efficiency 
and practicality over constitutional guarantees is not a philosophy that is endorsed 
today. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251 n.11 (1999) ("[l]t should go 
without saying that, if such [state sentencing] policies conflict with safeguards enshrined 
in the Constitution for the protection of the accused, those policies have to yield to the 
constitutional guarantees."); cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (''The founders of the American Republic were not prepared to 
leave [criminal justice] to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the 
least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been efficient; but it has 
always been free."). 
Now that we have come full circle, and the overriding goal of sentencing is no 
longer rehabilitation or reformation, but rather, the protection of society and punishment, 
opening the floodgates at sentencing to evidence not subject to confrontation to 
increase a defendant's fixed sentence cannot be countenanced or constitutionally 
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justified.5 See, e.g., State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 599-600 (2011) (gravity of the 
offense and need to protect society justified imposition of fixed life sentence upon child 
who was sixteen at the time of his offense); State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 836 
(2000) (primary objective of sentencing is protecting society and to achieve any or all of 
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution); State v Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 
363 (1956) (the good order and protection of society are the primary sentencing 
considerations to which all other factors are subservient); State v. Toohil/, 103 Idaho 
565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982)(the reasonableness of a sentence is determined by whether it 
is necessary to achieve the "primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any 
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given 
case. A sentence of confinement longer than necessary for these purposes is 
unreasonable."). 
Because punishment for serious offenses was inherent in a guilt verdict in 
colonial times, at our Nation's founding, and when the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation 
Clause was ratified, the protections of the Confrontation Clause extended to sentencing 
if not de jure, then de facto. Those witnesses who provided testimony against an 
accused at trial were subject to confrontation through cross-examination. Simply 
because the sentencing aspect of trial has been severed from the proceeding which 
results in a guilty verdict, does not mean the constitutional right to Confrontation can be 
denied at sentencing. The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation applies to testimonial 
evidence at sentencing, just as it applies to the determination of guilt. 
5 That is not to say violation of the right to confrontation has ever been or could have 
been justified. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged in the context of the right to 
jury trial, different means of proceeding to trial are inevitably more convenient and 
efficient than a jury trial, but delay and inconvenience are the price all free nations must 
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4. The District Court's Imposition Of Two Fixed Life Sentences Upon 
Mr. Shackelford Based On, Inter Alia, The Statements Of His Co-Defendants And 
The Missouri Prosecutor Violated The Confrontation Clause And Was An Abuse 
Of Discretion 
The district court's consideration of statements from Ms. Lasater, Ms. Millar and 
Sonja Abitz, Mr. Shackelford's co-defendants, as well as a letter from the then-Iron 
County Prosecuting Attorney, Scott Killen, for sentencing purposes, but over 
Mr. Shackelford's objection, was an abuse of discretion. The statements were 
testimonial and were not subject to cross-examination, despite Mr. Shackelford's 
objection. 
As different factual scenarios arose, the Supreme Court attempted to provide 
guidance as to what was and was not meant by "testimonial" within the context of the 
right to confrontation, relying heavily upon the text of the amendment itself, along with 
common law and colonial practice, and its own prior decisions. Bui/coming v. New 
Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (relying on Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 
305 (2009) to conclude the defendant was entitled under the Sixth Amendment to 
confront and cross-examine the analyst who analyzed his blood and whose report was 
relied upon by the State at trial; the State's offer of testimony through a surrogate who 
did not conduct the analysis violated the Confrontation Clause); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 
S Ct. 1143 (2011) (relying heavily on Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) to 
conclude victim's statements to police identifying and describing his shooter were not 
barred by the Confrontation Clause because circumstances objectively showed primary 
purpose of interrogation of the victim was to enable the police to respond to an ongoing 
emergency); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 305 (analyzing historical cases and applying 
pay for their liberties in more substantial matters. 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES, at 342-
44 (cited with approval in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 246 (1999)). 
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Crawford to hold the Confrontation Clause does not allow the prosecution to prove its 
case through ex parle out-of-court affidavits by laboratory analysts); Giles v. California, 
554 U.S. 353, 359-73 (2008) (reviewing text of confrontation clause and historical cases 
addressing forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine as an exception to the Confrontation 
Clause, which allowed unconfronted statements to be admitted against the defendant 
where the defendant's acts were designed to keep the witness from testifying, and 
denying to apply it in case where there was no finding of the defendant's intent to keep 
the witness from testifying); Davis, 547 U.S. at 824 n.3, 825 (analyzing text of 
confrontation clause and historical cases addressing what kinds of testimony it was 
applicable to). 
In Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, the Court explained that statements are nontestimonial 
if made in the course of a police interrogation under circumstances objectively showing 
the primary purpose of the interrogation was to allow police to meet an ongoing 
emergency. When there is no such ongoing emergency and the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to prove or establish past events, which may be relevant to later criminal 
proceedings, such statements are testimonial. Id. at 822. 
Here, the statements of Ms. Lasater and Ms. Millar were clearly written at the 
prosecutor's or PSI investigator's request, and were offered to prove or establish past 
events that would be relevant to sentencing. (UPSI, 7/17/11 and 7/18/11 Letters to 
Judge Stegner from Ms. Lasater (stating her belief about Mr. Shackelford's character, 
his responsibility for her incarceration and conviction for rape, and her belief in his past, 
current and future dangerousness); 7/25/11 Email "To Whom it may concern" from 
Ms. Millar (noting her fears of Mr. Shackelford and her belief he will harm her, and 
stating "I hope that this letter will help in the present proceeding against Dale 
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Shackelford.").) Sonja Abitz's testimony and statement regarding Mr. Shackelford 
prompted the district court to acknowledge "this statement [from Sonya Abitz, State's 
Exhibit 1 to her PSI] is some of the most incriminating testimony ... against Dale 
Shackelford. It didn't come out at trial." (Supplemental R. Vol.Ill, pp.500, 502 (State v. 
Sonja Abitz, Latah County Case No. CR00-00263 Sentencing Tr., p. 42, Ls.3-11 ).). 
Similarly, in his letter to the court, Mr. Killen explained his reasons for not pursuing 
charges against Mr. Shackelford for Forcible Rape and Armed Criminal Action (charges 
were brought but dismissed), Theft (charges never brought), and Conspiracy to commit 
First Degree Murder in Missouri (charges never brought). Mr. Killen characterized 
Mr. Shackelford as manipulative, a risk to public safety, and generally dangerous. 
(UPSI, Prosecutor Killen's letter to Judge Stegner.) . 
Mr. Shackelford was not provided with an opportunity to confront these accusers 
and cross-examine them, despite having objected to their letters and asserting his 
constitutional right to confrontation. The district court did not address Mr. Shackelford's 
objections but simply imposed sentence without specific reference to these letters; 
however, the prosecutor specifically addressed the letters and emphasized them to the 
district court in asking that fixed life sentences be imposed upon Mr. Shackelford, 
sentences far greater than the statute calls for. l.C. § 18-4004 ("the court shall impose a 
life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) years ... 
. "). Obviously these letters and the statements contained therein are statements of past 
events which were offered by the State to prove Mr. Shackelford is a dangerous man 
from whom society must be protected, i.e., protection of society, the most important 
sentencing consideration according to our courts. See, e.g., Draper, 151 Idaho at 599-
600 (gravity of the offense and need to protect society justified imposition of fixed life 
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sentence upon child who was sixteen at the time of his offense); Lundquist, 134 Idaho at 
836 (primary objective of sentencing is protecting society and to achieve any or all of 
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution); Moore, 78 Idaho at 363 (the 
good order and protection of society are the primary sentencing considerations to which 
all other factors are subservient); Toohif/, 103 Idaho at 568 (the reasonableness of a 
sentence is determined by whether it is necessary to achieve the "primary objective of 
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, 
rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case."). 
Because the statements of Prosecutor Killen, Ms. Abitz, Ms. Lasater and 
Ms. Millar were testimonial and were relied upon to impose two fixed life sentences, the 
statements violated Mr. Shackelford's confrontation rights. As a result, 
Mr. Shackelford's sentences must be vacated and his case remanded for sentencing 
before a different judge not exposed to the testimonial statements, or Prosecutor Killen, 
Ms. Abitz, Ms. Lasater and Ms. Millar should be required to appear at sentencing where 
they can be confronted and subject to cross-examination by Mr. Shackelford. 
D. Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Shackelford was constitutionally entitled to 
confront and cross-examine testimonial statements against him at sentencing. Despite 
his objection, the district court permitted the testimonial statements of Ms. Lasater, 
Ms. Millar, and Prosecutor Killen to be admitted without the benefit of confrontation, in 
violation of Mr. Shackelford's Sixth Amendment rights. Under these circumstances, the 
district court erred in permitting the unconfronted statements to be admitted against 
Mr. Shackelford and relied upon by the prosecutor at sentencing, resulting in two fixed 
life sentences. As a result, Mr. Shackelford's sentences must be vacated and his case 
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remanded for resentencing where Ms. Millar, Ms. Lasater, Ms. Abitz and Mr. Killen will 
be required to testify and be subject to cross-examination, or the State will not be 
permitted to admit such testimonial statements. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Considering Impermissible Victim Impact 
Evidence In Sentencing Mr. Shackelford 
A. Introduction 
The district court abused its discretion in considering a victim impact letter from a 
person who was not Mr. Shackelford's victim when imposing sentence. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Considering Impermissible Victim 
Impact Evidence In Sentencing Mr. Shackelford 
The district court admitted and presumably considered a victim impact letter from 
a person who was neither Mr. Shackelford's victim nor an immediate family member of 
his victims. In doing so, the court abused its discretion by admitting and considering 
such improper evidence when it sentenced Mr. Shackelford to serve the maximum 
sentences it could impose: two fixed life sentences. 
At sentencing, the court invited the State to present the statements of victims or 
family members. (39398 Tr., p.36, L.23 - p.37, L.2.) After reporting none were present, 
the prosecutor referred the court back to the family and victim statements from 
Mr. Shackelford's PSI, as well as the UPSI. (39398 Tr., p.37, Ls.3-25.) Over 
Mr. Shackelford's written objection, the statement of Suzanne Birrell Ninichuck was not 
excluded from consideration at sentencing and was not stricken as an attachment to the 
UPSI. (R.39398, UPSI, pp.2, 57-58.) Ms. Ninichuck was a friend of Donna Fontaine but 
the two were not family members. (R.39398, UPSI, p.57.) 
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Idaho has adopted certain protections for crime victims at various stages of a 
criminal prosecution, and has included within those protections immediate family 
members of homicide victims. See Idaho Const. art. I, § 22; l.C. § 19-5306. Those 
protections include the right of a crime victim or an immediate family member of a 
homicide victim to be heard at sentencing proceedings, to be consulted during the 
preparation of the PSI, and to "have included in that report a statement of the impact 
which the defendant's criminal conduct had upon the victim .... " l.C. § 19-5306 (1 )(f), 
(h). The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted section 19-5306's immediate family 
member provision to include spouses, children, brothers, sisters, mothers and fathers, 
and in-laws of the same degree of relation, i.e., mother-in-law, sister-in-law, daughter-in-
law. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 575-76 (2008). Statements offered by persons who 
are not immediate family members are inadmissible. Id. 
"Whether a person is a victim under Idaho Code section 19-5306 is a factual 
determination that is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 
367, 373-74 (2008). Appellate courts apply a three-part test to determine whether a 
district court has abused its discretion: (1) whether the court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted consistent with applicable legal 
standards and within the outer bounds of its discretion; and (3) whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 771 
(2010). 
Here, the district court's failure to explicitly exclude Ms. Ninichuck's statements 
from its consideration at sentencing, despite Mr. Shackelford's objection, constituted an 
abuse of discretion. Ms. Ninichuck was not Donna Fontaine's spouse, child, sister, or 
mother, or an in-law of a similar degree of relation. Absent a recognized familial 
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relationship, her statement was inadmissible because she was neither a direct victim of 
Mr. Shackelford's criminal conduct nor an immediate family member of a victim. 
Although the district court did not explicitly reference Ms. Ninichuck's statement, or any 
other for that matter, because Mr. Shackelford received a fixed life sentence in 
connection with Ms. Fontaine's death, the maximum sentence he could possibly 
receive, it cannot be said the statement had no impact on the sentence imposed. Thus, 
the inclusion and consideration of Ms. Ninichucks's statements in the court's sentencing 
decision constituted an abuse of discretion, requiring Mr. Shackelford's sentence to be 
vacated and his case remanded for resentencing before a different judge. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained above, the district court abused its discretion in 
sentencing Mr. Shackelford to serve two fixed life sentences. The district court also 
erred in considering testimony that was not subject to confrontation in reaching its 
sentencing decision. As a result, Mr. Shackelford's sentences must be vacated and his 
case remanded for sentencing before a different judge. 
DATED this 21 51 day of May, 2012. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
41 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of May, 2012, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing (AMENDED) APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be 
placed a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD 
INMATE #64613 
l.C.C. 
P.O. BOX 70010 
BOISE, IDAHO 83707 
L. LAMONT ANDERSON 
CHIEF, CAPITAL LITIGATION UNIT 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand-Delivered Supreme Court Mailbox 
HONORABLE JOHN R. STEGNER 
LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
PO BOX 8068 
MOSCOW, IDAHO 83843 
RAY BARKER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 9408 
MOSCOW ID 83843 
Administrative Assistant, CLU 
42 
